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STUDENT NoT s
was a matter of degree. So long as the basis of criminal responsibility
Is predicated upon negligence it is immaterial whether the defendant
was engaged in a lawful or an unlawful act,2 or what the degree of
the homicide happened to be,
2 ' the only question being whether, under
that particular situation, the defendant's conduct measured up to that
of an ordinary man. It, therefore, seems erroneous to instruct that
simply because the defendant was using a dangerous weapon a higher
degree of care should be required, or on the other hand that criminal
liability cannot be imposed unless there is something in the nature of
gross negligence. In determining criminal responsibility based upon
violation of any duty owed to the state, the jury should be instructed
as to whether, under that particular situation, the defendant exercised
such care as an ordinary man would have exercised.
CnTErxI s TIGNOn.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE-STANDARD OF CARE NECESSARY
The defendant was indicted for manslaughter. The act of culpa-
bility as alleged In the information was that defendant feloniously and
recklessly, without regard to the lives or safety of others, placed a
loaded trap gun in such a position and manner on the inside of his
chili stand in Joplin, Missouri, as to cause said gun to be fired or
discharged by the movement or opening of a certain window in the
building. The court instructed the jury that culpable or criminal
negligence, within the meaning of the law, is the omission on the
part of a person to do some act under given circumstances which an
ordinarily careful and prudent man would do under like circum-
stances, or the doing of some act, under given circumstances, which
an ordinarily careful and prudent man under like circumstances
would not do, and by reason of which omission or action another per-
son is endangered in life or bodily safety. The supreme court of
the state of Missouri upheld the instructions of the lower court as
being correct.1
The court in the principal case adopted the standard of care laid
down by the majority of the courts in civil cases based on actions of
tort. It shall be the purpose of this paper to attempt to show that such
a standard of care should be followed by the courts in cases based on
criminal negligence. However, the court must keep in mind the fact
that in these cases they are dealing with Crime, and not mere civil
liability. Therefore, they should instruct the jury that the negligence
of the accused must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, and
not by mere preponderance of the evidence, as is the general rule in
cases involving civil liability.
'Comm. v. Adams, 114 Mass. 323 (1873).
Gregory v. State, 152 Miss. 133, 118 So. 906 (1928).
State v. Beckham, 306 Mo. 566, 267 S. W. 817 (1924).
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When do the negligent acts of an individual cease to be mere
negligence and become criminal negligence? It has been said, "The
term criminal negligence has reference mainly to the authority by
whom reparation is sought. An inseparable incident of criminal negli-
gence may be that it is a violation of duty imposed for the preserva-
tion of human life. It is criminal because it constitutes a violation
of an obligation to the state, which can be remittea only by the state.
Criminal negligence Per Se does not differ from negligence simply. The
same negligence as it affects the individual and the state is respectively
gross negligence and criminal negligence, while it is the ground work
of reparation to the private individual; however heinous it may be it
is no more than negligence. So soon as it is the subject matter in re-
spect of which reparation is exacted by the state, it becomes criminal
negligence. . . Criminal negligence then is negilgence in such cir-
cumstances that it imposes an obligation remissible by the state, but
irremissible by the individual actually damnified by it, and since the
state will not lightly intervene, criminal negligence must be some
substantial thing and not a mere casual inadvertence. Between crim-
inal negligence, however, and actionable negligence, there is no prin-
ciple of discrimination, but a question of degree only."'
It Is well settled that a negligent act or failure to act may be the
basis for a manslaughter.' Quaere: What degree of negligence will
suffice to justify a conviction? It is conceded that at the present time
a majority of the courts say that negligence must be in the nature of
recklessness and indifference.4 However, it is submitted that stare
decisis should not be an impediment in cases involving criminal lia-
bility. The purpose of a criminal action is the protection of society,
and not any individual right. However, such an action must be based
upon justice. That is most just which is most fair. Can it be argued
that a fairer result for all parties concerned can be reached by fol-
lowing the standard of "Ordinary Care" than that of "Reckless
Disregard"?
The tendency of criminal courts in the present day is to enlarge
the safety of individuals from the negligent onslaughts of other mem-
bers of society. From the time of the early English law we see
attempts made by the courts and text writers to adopt a uniform
standard, for injuries inflicted upon the person of another by negli-
gence. Reading from passages of early English law, we see attempts
to adopt the standard of care of an "ordinary man" In cases of man-
slaughter committed through negligence. One early English writer
says, "Law in these cases does not require the utmost caution that
can be used, it is sufficient that a reasonable precaution, what is usual
'Beven, Negligence in Law, Vol. 3, p. 7.
3 See 61 L. R. A. 277-note.
4People v. Adams, 289 Illinois 339, 124 N. E. 575 (1919); Fitz-
gerald v. State, 112 Ala. 34, 20 So. 966 (1896); State v. Clark, 196
Iowa 1134, 196 N. W. 82 (1923); People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148
N. W. 400 (1914).
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and ordinary in like cases be taken. '5 While another says the cri-
terion in such eases is whether common or social duty would, under
the circumstances, have suggested a more "circumspect conduct."O
While still a third says the criterion is whether or not he used "due
diligence." 7 The foregoing show the idea in its embryonic stage of
adopting a standard which could be applied to all cases with a reason-
able assurance that justice to all would be equally and fairly
administered.
Wrongs may be placed in two categories, public and private. "A
private wrong", otherwise termed a "tort" or "civil injury" ,is "an
Infringement or privation of the civil rights which belong to indi-
viduals, considered merely as individuals." A public offense, or crime,
is "a breach and violation of the public rights and duties due to the
whole community, considered as a community in its social aggregate
capacity." s
As has been said before, by the weight of authority the negligence
required in criminal cases must be more than the failure to exercise
the care of an "ordinary man" under like or similar circumstances.
Quaere: Could the tort standard of care be used in cases of criminal
negligence and a better result be reached than that gained by the
majority rule?
The term "reasonable man" denotes a person exercising those
qualities of knowledge, concept of duty, intelligence, and judgment
which society requires of its members for the protection of their own
interests and the interests of others.
One advantage to be gained by the adoption of the tort standard
of care in criminal negligence cases, is that the minds of the jurors
are relieved from the vague and illusory task of determining hair
splitting distinctions as to due care and negligence, and then refitting
them in their respective compartments.
Although "culpable negligence" in criminal law is usually defined
as an offense resulting from an accident produced by such careless-
ness and recklessness on the part of the party charged as to indicate
a disregard for the safety of others, 1 one court has gone so far as to
define "culpable negligence" as the omission to do something which a
reasonable and prudent person would do, or the doing of something
which such a person would not do under the circumstances surround-
Ing the particular case.
It has been said in tort actions that "gross" negligence is nothing
5Foster's Crown Law (1791) 302.
e1 East's Cases of the Crown (1806) 268.
7 Hale's Pleas of the Crown (1680) 475.
'4 Bl. Comm. 5; see 16 C. J. 50, and cases there cited.
I"Sipra note 4.
"Nail v. State, 33 Okla. Cr. 100, 242 Pac. 270 (1926).
11 See American Digest System, Criminal Law, Key No. 23.
198 KENTucY LAW JouRN
more than negligence with a vituperative epithet.22 Is it not best to
say that it is only reasonable care that is required in any case; but the
greater the danger the more precautions and the closer vigilance rea-
sonable care requires? Rather than to say in order to find the de-
fendant guilty of a crime you must find that he was guilty of "wanton"
or reckless disregard for the safety of others. The suggested standard
would be open, practicable, and easily applied to any given statement
of facts, instead of being a standard based entirely upon degree.
The term "culpable" or "gross" negligence is vague and illusory,
and places upon the jury the burden of making an arbitrary decision,
which may be based upon facts which are not any too clear, while
the adoption of the standard of care of an "ordinary" man would eradi-
cate these difficulties, and place before the jury a clear mental picture
of just what their duties consisted of, thereby simplifying, and at the
same time clarifying, their sworn duty to the state, thus enabling them
to reach a practical and just decision.
The terms "gross negligence" and "reckless disregard" are not
very helpful in determining what the term criminal negligence means.
It is better to describe negligence in terms of care or caution, and to
say one is guilty of manslaughter if he kills another in the commission
of an act in such a way that an ordinarily prudent person under the
circumstances would not have acted. We cannot say, however, that
he is guilty merely because he did not adopt the safest mode of doing
the act, even though that mode were accessible; on the other hand In
order to be guilty he need not have adopted a clearly unsafe mode. It
is submitted that the proper test should be, "Did he exercise the care
of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances in adopting
the mode of acting which he followed?"
It is well known that cases based upon criminal negligence do not
require a criminal intent, as is the usual rule in cases of homicide in
general. It is submitted that "gross" and "culpable" negligence are
so closely associated with actual intent that it is almost impossible to
separate the two entirely, and reach a result which is based upon
negligence alone, which is the desired result.
It is the duty of every citizen of a state to conduct himself In a
manner consistent with reason and due care. Is it fair to the other
members of society to say that a man must be guilty of an act border-
ing on actual intent as is required, before it can be said that he has
been guilty of gross negligence, before society should be entitled to
protection from his depredations? If his conduct is not that of a
gentleman, and of one who recognizes his duty to safeguard the lives
and property of others, then he should be removed beyond the sphere
of every-day society and given an opportunity to meditate on his mis-
deeds and capricious conduct.
Every negligent omission of a legal duty whereby death ensues
to another is indictable either as murder or manslaughter. When a
uWilson v. Brett (1843 Exch.) 11 M. & W. 113-116.
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man, says Archbold," takes upon himself an office or duty requiring
skill or care, if, by his ignorance, carelessness, or negligence he causes
the death of another, he will be guilty of manslaughter.
If there be any negligence or want of proper care in the action of
any person from which death to another ensues, the cause of such
death cannot be said to be purely accidental; it is the consequence
of such act of negligence or want of proper care, and criminal liability
should attach, without proving there was a reckless disregard for the
lives of others on the part of the one accused.
It is generally well known that in cases of criminal liability based
upon negligence an intent is not required. Yet some of the cases,
holding the accused must be guilty of gross negligence, say that such
gross negligence will supply the criminal intent.
1V Such a result shows
the confusion in which a court finds itself in trying to separate gross
negligence and criminal intent.
It is often said that the negligence or carelessness must be so
gross as to imply a criminal intent, but the question still remains as
to when it reaches that point, and no rule by which to test it has been
or can be given.
A man is responsible for the natural consequences of his criminal
acts, although from ignorance, carelessness, or neglect, he does not take
precautionary measures to prevent those consequences.
So long as the crime resulted from the neglect of a plain legal
duty imposed by law or contract upon the defendant personally, is it
fair to the other members of society to say that the one in breach of
his legal duty must have shown a "wanton" or "reckless" disregard for
the safety of others? Such a position is untenable and is without
merit.
It might well be argued that Kentucky is in accord with the
majority in saying that a person may be guilty of an offense resulting
from negligence if it was produced by such carelessness and reckless-
ness on his part as to indicate a disregard for the safety of others.
5
However, the Kentucky courts say that the carelessness or recklessness,
necessary to convert the accident from an innocent into a guilty one,
must occur under such circumstances as to indicate a disregard on
the part of the perpetrator for the safety of others. It is submitted
that such a qualification could be complied with more logically by
showing that the perpetrator did not exercise that degree of care
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used under the same
or similar circumstances.
13 Bishop Crim. Law (6th ed. 1923), See. 314, p. 178.
State v. Irvine, 126 La. 534, 52 So. 667 (1910).
Pray v. Commonwealth, 181 Ky. 396, 205 S. W. 404 (1918).
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Conclusion
In order to reach more just decisions, and in order to facilitate
present day litigation in the criminal courts, certainly there can be no
harm done in incorporating into the criminal law certain standards
and measurements as they exist in the civil law. However, the court
should take cognizance of the fact that it is dealing with a crime and
not merely a civil action between two or more individuals. The
standard of care proposed in this paper will cover any given sort of
situation and make it possible for the court to instruct the jury fairly
and clearly, and at the same time make it possible for the jury to
reach a just verdict after the case has been presented to them.
The growth of criminal law in this country has been more re-
tarded than that of any other branch of the law. It is time to call a
halt to the old guesswork manner of construing what the law is, and
start applying sound principles based upon the facts of the case as it
was presented before the court.
W. S. JLTT, JR.
